| Zeki, S., Aglioti, S., McKeefry, D., Berlucchi, G. The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 1999 (96)24 [html] |
| We have studied patient PB, who, after an electric shock that led to vascular insufficiency, became virtually blind, although he retained a capacity to see colors consciously. For our psychophysical studies, we used a simplified version of the Land experiments [Land, E. (1974) Proc. R. Inst. G. B. 47, 23-58] to learn whether color constancy mechanisms are intact in him, which amounts to learning whether he can assign a constant color to a surface in spite of changes in the precise wavelength composition of the light reflected from that surface. We supplemented our psychophysical studies with imaging ones, using functional magnetic resonance, to learn something about the location of areas that are active in his brain when he perceives colors. The psychophysical results suggested that color constancy mechanisms are severely defective in PB and that his color vision is wavelength-based. The imaging results showed that, when he viewed and recognized colors, significant increases in activity were restricted mainly to V1-V2. We conclude that a partly defective color system operating on its own in a severely damaged brain is able to mediate a conscious experience of color in the virtually total absence of other visual abilities. |
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| Zeki, S. Toward a theory of visual consciousness 1999 [pdf] |
| The visual brain consists of several parallel, functionally specialized processing systems, each having several stages (nodes) which terminate their tasks at different times; consequently, simultaneously presented attributes are perceived at the same time if processed at the same node and at different times if processed by different nodes. Clinical evidence shows that these processing systems can act fairly autonomously. Damage restricted to one system compromises specifically the perception of the attribute that that system is specialized for; damage to a given node of a processing system that leaves earlier nodes intact results in a degraded perceptual capacity for the relevant attribute, which is directly related to the physiological capacities of the cells left intact by the damage. By contrast, a system that is spared when all others are damaged can function more or less normally. Moreover, internally created visual percepts illusions, afterimages, imagery, and hallucinations activate specifically the nodes specialized for the attribute perceived. Finally, anatomical evidence shows that there is no final integrator station in the brain, one which receives input from all visual areas; instead, each node has multiple outputs and no node is recipient only. Taken together, the above evidence leads us to propose that each node of a processing-perceptual system creates its own microconsciousness. We propose that, if any binding occurs to give us our integrated image of the visual world, it must be a binding between microconsciousnesses generated at different nodes. Since any two microconsciousnesses generated at any two nodes can be bound together, perceptual integration is not hierarchical, but parallel and postconscious. By contrast, the neural machinery conferring properties on those cells whose activity has a conscious correlate is hierarchical, and we refer to it as generative binding, to distinguish it from the binding that might occur between the microconsciousnesses. |
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