| Jakab, Z. Color Experience: Empirical Evidence Against Representational Externalism 2001 [pdf] |
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| Byrne, A., Hilbert, D.R. Color Realism and Color Science Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2003 26 [html] |
| he target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical objects are not colored, and that the colors are "subjective" or "in the mind." The article has two other purposes: first, to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to some distinctively philosophical tools that are useful in tackling the problem of color realism and, second, to clarify the various positions and central arguments in the debate. The first part explains the problem of color realism and makes some useful distinctions. These distinctions are then used to expose various confusions that often prevent people from seeing that the issues are genuine and difficult, and that the problem of color realism ought to be of interest to anyone working in the field of color science. The second part explains the various leading answers to the problem of color realism, and (briefly) argues that all views other than our own have serious difficulties or are unmotivated. The third part explains and motivates our own view, that colors are types of reflectances, and defends it against objections made in the recent literature that are often taken as fatal. |
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| Cohen, J. On The Structural Properties of the Colors Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2003 (81)1 [pdf] |
| Primary quality theories of color claim that colors are intrinsic, objective, mind-independent properties of external objects | that colors, like size and shape, are examples of the sort of properties moderns such as Boyle and Locke called primary qualities of body.1 Primary quality theories have long been seen as one of the main philosophical options for understanding the nature of color. However, a recent, empirically motivated argument seems to have convinced many that primary quality theories cannot be sustained. This argument, in outline, alleges that colors bear structural relations to each other that no primary qualities bear to each other, and therefore that colors cannot be primary qualities. This argument has received considerable philosophical attention in recent years, and appears to have convinced many to abandon primary quality theories of color.2 However, I believe the argument has been misunderstood. In this paper I shall examine arguments based on the structural properties of the colors in order to discern what they do and do not show about primary quality theories of color. |
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| Clark, A. Spectrum Inversion and the Color Solid Southern Journal of Philosophy 1985 (23)4:431-443 [html] |
| The possibility that what looks red to me may look green to you has traditionally been known as "spectrum inversion." This possibility is thought to create difficulties for any attempt to define mental states in terms of behavioral dispositions or functional roles. If spectrum inversion is possible, then it seems that two perceptual states may have identical functional antecedents and effects yet differ in their qualitative content. In that case the qualitative character of the states could not be functionally defined. |
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