| Crick, F., Koch, C. A framework for consciousness Nature Neuroscience 2003 (6)2:119-126 [pdf] |
| Here we summarize our present approach to the problem of consciousness. After an introduction outlining our general strategy, we describe what is meant by the term 'framework' and set it out under ten headings. This framework offers a coherent scheme for explaining the neural correlates of (visual) consciousness in terms of competing cellular assemblies. Most of the ideas we favor have been suggested before, but their combination is original. We also outline some general experimental approaches to the problem and, finally, acknowledge some relevant aspects of the brain that have been left out of the proposed framework. |
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| Tong, F., Nakayama, K., Vaughan, J.T., Kanwisher, N. Binocular rivalry and visual awareness in human extrastriate cortex Neuron 1998 (21):753-759 [pdf] |
| We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to monitor stimulus-selective responses of the human fusiform face area (FFA) and parahippocampal place area (PPA) during binocular rivalry in which a face and a house stimulus were presented to different eyes. Though retinal stimulation remained constant, subjects perceived changes from house to face that were accompanied by increasing FFA and decreasing PPA activity; perceived changes from face to house led to the opposite pattern of responses. These responses during rivalry were equal in magnitude to those evoked by nonrivalrous stimulus alternation, suggesting that activity in the FFA and PPA reflects the perceived rather than the retinal stimulus, and that neural competition during binocular rivalry has been resolved by these stages of visual processing. |
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| Jack, A.I., Shallice, T. Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition 2001 (79)1-2:161-196 [pdf] |
| Most theories of consciousness are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for Type-C processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology. |
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| Mitchell, J.F., Stoner, G.R., Reynolds, J.H. Object-based attention determines dominance in binocular rivalry Nature 2004 (429):410-413 [pdf] |
| A question of long-standing interest to philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists is how the brain selects which signals enter consciousness1,2. Binocular rivalry and attention both involve selection of visual stimuli, but affect perception quite differently. During binocular rivalry, awareness alternates between two different stimuli presented to the two eyes. In contrast, attending to one of two different stimuli impairs discrimination of the ignored stimulus, but without causing it to disappear from consciousness. Here we show that despite this difference, attention and rivalry rely on shared object-based selection mechanisms. We cued attention to one of two superimposed transparent surfaces and then deleted the image of one surface from each eye, resulting in rivalry. Observers usually reported seeing only the cued surface. They were also less accurate in judging unpredictable changes in the features of the uncued surface. Our design ensured that selection of the cued surface could not have resulted from spatial, ocular or feature-based mechanisms. Rather, attention was drawn to one surface, and this caused the other surface to be perceptually suppressed during rivalry. These results raise the question of how object representations compete during these two forms of perceptual selection, even as the features of those objects change unpredictably over time. |
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| Goebel, R. & al Sustained extrastriate cortical activation without visual awareness revealed by fMRI studies of hemianopic patients Vision Research 2001 (3):1459-74 [html] |
| Patients with lesions in the primary visual cortex (V1) may show processing of visual stimuli presented in their field of cortical blindness even when they report being unaware of the stimuli. To elucidate the neuroanatomical basis of their residual visual functions, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging in two hemianopic patients, FS and GY. In the first experiment, a rotating spiral stimulus was used to assess the responsiveness of dorsal stream areas. Although no response was detectable within denervated or destroyed early visual cortex, motion-sensitive areas (hMT+/V5) ipsilateral to the lesion showed a strong sustained hemodynamic response. In GY, this activation was at least as strong as that of his contralesional hMT+/V5 to the stimulus in the normal hemifield. In the second experiment, coloured images of natural objects were used to assess the responsiveness of ventral stream areas. Again, no activity was detectable in ipsilesional early visual areas, but extrastriate areas in the lateral occipital cortex (hMT+/V5 and LO) and within the posterior fusiform gyrus (V4/V8) showed a robust sustained hemodynamic response. In both experiments, we observed that ipsilesional areas responded to stimuli presented in either hemifield, whereas the normal hemisphere responded preferentially to stimuli in the sighted hemifield. As only one subject occasionally noticed the onset of stimulation in the impaired field, the unexpectedly strong sustained activity in ipsilesional dorsal and ventral cortical areas appears to be insufficient to generate conscious vision. |
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| Engel, A.K. & al Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness Consciousness and Cognition 1999 (8)2:128-151 [pdf] |
| Cognitive functions like perception, memory, language, or consciousness are based on highly parallel and distributed information processing by the brain. One of the major unresolved questions is how information can be integrated and how coherent representational states can be established in the distributed neuronal systems subserving these functions. It has been suggested that this so-called binding problem may be solved in the temporal domain. The hypothesis is that synchronization of neuronal discharges can serve for the integration of distributed neurons into cell assemblies and that this process may underlie the selection of perceptually and behaviorally relevant information. As we intend to show here, this temporal binding hypothesis has implications for the search of the neural correlate of consciousness. We review experimental results, mainly obtained in the visual system, which support the notion of temporal binding. In particular, we discuss recent experiments on the neural mechanisms of binocular rivalry which suggest that appropriate synchronization among cortical neurons may be one of the necessary conditions for the buildup of perceptual states and awareness of sensory stimuli. |
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| Critchley, H.D. & al neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness Nature Neuroscience 189-195 [pdf] |
| Influential theories of human emotion argue that subjective feeling states involve representation of bodily responses elicited by emotional events. Within this framework, individual differences in intensity of emotional experience reflect variation in sensitivity to internal bodily responses. We measured regional brain activity by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during an interoceptive task wherein subjects judged the timing of their own heartbeats. We observed enhanced activity in insula, somatomotor and cingulate cortices. In right anterior insular/opercular cortex, neural activity predicted subjects' accuracy in the heartbeat detection task. Furthermore, local gray matter volume in the same region correlated with both interoceptive accuracy and subjective ratings of visceral awareness. Indices of negative emotional experience correlated with interoceptive accuracy across subjects. These findings indicate that right anterior insula supports a representation of visceral responses accessible to awareness, providing a substrate for subjective feeling states. |
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