The
book proposes a novel view to explain how we as humans -- contrary to
current robots -- can have the impression of consciously feeling
things: for example the red of a sunset, the smell of a rose, the sound
of a symphony, or a pain.
The book starts off by looking at
visual perception. The eye contains many defects which should seriously
interfere with vision. Yet we have the impression of seeing the world
perfectly well. Explaining how this is possible leads to a new idea
about what seeing really is: Seeing is not receiving information in the
brain, but a way of interacting with the world. The book goes against
the received view according to which the brain creates visual
sensation. Instead the book claims that the role of the brain is to
enable vision-specific interactions with the world.
This
"sensorimotor" approach to seeing is extended in the second part of the
book to encompass the other senses: hearing, touch, taste and smell. By
taking different sensory experience as different ways of interacting
with the world, it becomes possible to explain why experiences are
different in the way they are. It also explains why the vast majority
brain functions (e.g. digestion, balance, and even thoughts) are not
accompanied by any real feeling.
The "sensorimotor" approach is
not simply a philosophical argument: It leads to scientifically
verifiable predictions and new research directions. Among these are the
phenomena of change blindness, sensory substitution, "looked but failed
to see", as well as results on color naming and color perception and
the localisation of touch on the body.
The approach is
relevant to the question of what animals and babies can feel, and to
understanding what will be necessary for robots to become conscious.